Abstract. In this paper we present a new statistical cryptanalytic technique that we call improbable differential cryptanalysis which uses a differential that is less probable when the correct key is used. We provide data complexity estimates for this kind of attacks and we also show a method to expand impossible differentials to improbable differentials. By using this expansion method, we cryptanalyze 13, 14, and 15-round CLEFIA for the key sizes of length 128, 192, and 256 bits, respectively. These are the best cryptanalytic results on CLEFIA up to this date.
Introduction
Statistical attacks on block ciphers make use of a property of the cipher so that an incident occurs with different probabilities depending on whether the correct key is used or not. For instance, differential cryptanalysis [1] considers characteristics or differentials which show that a particular output difference should be obtained with a relatively high probability when a particular input difference is used. Hence, when the correct key is used, the predicted differences occur more frequently. In a classical differential characteristic the differences are fully specified and in a truncated differential [2] only parts of the differences are specified.
On the other hand, impossible differential cryptanalysis [3] uses an impossible differential which shows that a particular difference cannot occur for the correct key (i.e. probability of this event is exactly zero). Therefore, if these differences are satisfied under a trial key, then it cannot be the correct one. Thus, the correct key can be obtained by eliminating all or most of the wrong keys.
In this paper we describe a new variant of differential cryptanalysis in which a given differential holds with a relatively small probability. Therefore, when the correct key is used, the predicted differences occur less
Improbable Differential Cryptanalysis
Statistical attacks on block ciphers make use of a property of the cipher so that an incident occurs with different probabilities depending on whether the correct key is used or not. We denote the probability of observing the incident under a wrong key with p and p 0 denotes the probability of observing the incident under the correct key.
In previously defined statistical differential attacks on block ciphers, a differential is more probable for the correct key than a random key (i.e. p 0 > p). Moreover, an impossible differential attack uses an impossible differential that is not possible when tried with the correct key (i.e. p 0 = 0). We define the improbable differential attack as a statistical differential attack in which a given differential is less probable than a random key (i.e. p 0 < p). Hence, improbable differential attacks can be seen as the exact opposite of differential attacks.
We aim to find a differential with α input difference and β output difference so that these differences are observed with probability p 0 for the correct key and with probability p for a wrong key where p 0 < p. One way of obtaining such differences is by finding nontrivial differentials that have α input difference and an output difference other than β, or vice versa. Hence these differentials reduce the probability of observing the differences α and β under the correct key.
We define an improbable differential as a differential that does not have the output difference β with a probability p , when the input difference is α. Thus, p denotes the total probability of nontrivial differentials having α input difference with an output difference other than β. Hence for the correct key, probability of observing the α and β differences (i.e. satisfying the improbable differential) becomes p 0 = p · (1 − p ). Note that p 0 is larger than p · (1 − p ) if there are nontrivial differentials having α input difference and β output difference. Hence the attacker should check the existance of such differentials.
An improbable differential can be obtained by using a miss in the middle [3] like technique which we call the almost miss in the middle technique. Let α difference becomes δ with probability p 1 after r 1 rounds of encryption and β difference becomes γ after r 2 rounds of decryption as shown in Fig. 1 . With the assumption that these two events are independent, if δ is different than γ, then α difference does not become β with probability p = p 1 · p 2 after r 1 + r 2 rounds of encryption. Note that p 1 and p 2 equal to 1 in the miss in the middle technqiue. Furthermore, we define an expansion method for constructing an improbable differential from an impossible differential in Sect. 2.2. Note that the impossible differential attacks can be seen as a special case of improbable differential attacks where the probability p is taken as 1.
Data Complexity and Success Probability
Since p 0 is less than p, our aim is to use N plaintext pairs and count the hits that every guessed subkey gets and expect that the counter for the correct subkey to be less than a threshold T . Number of hits a wrong subkey gets can be seen as a random variable of a binomial distribution with parameters N , p (and a random variable of a binomial distribution with parameters N , p 0 for the correct subkey). We denote the non-detection error probability with p nd which is the probability of the counter for the correct subkey to be higher than T . And we denote the false alarm error probability with p f a which is the probability of the counter for a wrong subkey to be less than or equal to T . Therefore, the success probability of an improbable differential attack is 1 − p nd .
Accurate estimates of the data complexity and success probability for many statistical attacks are provided by Blondeau et al. in [6, 7] and these estimates can be used for improbable differential attacks with some modifications. Unlike improbable differential cryptanalysis, in most of the statistical attacks p 0 > p and this assumption is made throughout [6] . Hence, we need to modify the approximations N , N and N ∞ of the number of required samples N that are given in [6] for the p 0 < p case in order to use them for improbable differential attacks. We first define the Kullback-Leibler divergence which plays an important role in these estimates.
Definition 1 (Kullback-Leibler divergence [13] ). Let P and Q be two Bernoulli probability distributions of parameters p and q. The Kullback -Leibler divergence between P and Q is defined by
Secondly, we modify Algorithm 1 of [6] for the p 0 < p case which computes the exact number of required samples N and corresponding relative threshold τ := T N to reach error probabilities less than (p nd , p f a ). The estimates for non-detection and false alarm error probabilities are denoted by G nd (N, τ ) and G f a (N, τ ).
Algorithm 1.
[from [6] , modified for the
Compute
N nd and N f a can be calculated by a dichotomic search and the following Equations 1 and 2 can be used for the estimates G nd (N, τ ) and G f a (N, τ ), respectively. The number of samples obtained from the algorithm with these estimates is denoted by N ∞ .
Theorem 1 ([14]
). Let p 0 and p be two real numbers such that 0 < p 0 < p < 1 and let τ such that p 0 < τ < p. Let Σ 0 and Σ k follow a binomial law of respective parameters (N, p 0 ) and (N, p). Then as N → ∞,
and
A simple approximation N of N is defined in [6] when the relative threshold is chosen as τ = p 0 which makes non-detection error probability p nd of order 1/2. We define N for the p 0 < p case as in [15] : Proposition 1. For a relative threshold τ = p 0 , a good approximation of the required number of pairs N to distinguish between the correctly keyed permutation and an incorrectly keyed permutation with false alarm probability less than or equal to p f a is
where
In [6] a good approximation of N which is also valid for the p 0 < p case is defined as follows
Improbable Differentials from Impossible Differentials
An improbable differential can be obtained by combining a differential (or two) with an impossible differential in order to obtain improbable differentials covering more rounds. Let δ γ be an impossible differential and α → δ and γ ← β be two differentials with probabilities p 1 and p 2 , respectively. Then we can construct improbable differentials α γ, δ β and α β with probabilities p equal to p 1 , p 2 and p 1 · p 2 as shown in Fig. 2 .
This expansion method can be used to construct improbable differentials to distinguish more rounds of the cipher from a random permutation; or an impossible differential attack can be turned into an improbable differential attack on more rounds of the cipher when suitable differentials α → δ or γ ← β exist. However, such a conversion might require more data to obtain the correct key and hence result in higher data and time complexity. If the size of the guessed key decreases in the converted improbable differential attack, so does the memory complexity. The guessed subkeys can be represented by one bit of an array in impossible differential attacks. However, we need to keep counters for the subkeys in improbable differential attacks and hence the memory complexity is higher when the same number of subkeys are guessed. 
Notation
We use the notations provided in Table 1 in the following sections. Fig. 3 where S 0 and S 1 are 8 × 8-bit S-boxes. The two matrices M 0 and M 1 that are used in the F-functions are defined as follows.
0x01 0x02 0x04 0x06 0x02 0x01 0x06 0x04 0x04 0x06 0x01 0x02 0x06 0x04 0x02 0x01
0x01 0x08 0x02 0x0a 0x08 0x01 0x0a 0x02 0x02 0x0a 0x01 0x08 0x0a 0x02 0x08 0x01
The encryption function uses four 32-bit whitening keys ( 
Improbable Differential Attacks on CLEFIA
In this section, we present 10-round improbable differentials and introduce an improbable differential attack on 13-round CLEFIA with key length of 128 bits. We also introduce improbable differential attacks on 14 and 15-round CLEFIA for key lengths 196 and 256 bits in Appendix A and B. Moreover, we provide a practical improbable differential attack on 6-round CLEFIA in Appendix C. In these attacks our aim is to derive the round keys and we do not consider the key scheduling part as done in [9] [10] [11] .
10-round Improbable Differentials
We will use the following two 9-round impossible differentials that are introduced in [10] ,
where X (8) and Y (8) are non-zero differences. We obtain 10-round improbable differentials by adding the following one-round differentials to the top of these 9-round impossible differentials,
which hold when the output difference of the F 0 function is ζ (resp. ζ ) when the input difference is [ψ, 0, 0, 0] (resp. [0, 0, ψ, 0]). We choose ψ and corresponding ζ and ζ depending on the difference distribution table (DDT) of S 0 in order to increase the probability of the differential. One can observe that the values 10, 8, 6 and 4 appear 9, 119, 848 and 5037 times in the DDT of S 0 , respectively. When ψ, ζ and ζ is chosen according to these differences, the average probability of the 10-round improbable differentials becomes p = ((9 · 10 + 119 · 8 + 848 · 6 + 5037 · 4)/256)/6013 ≈ 2 −5.87 .
Improbable Differential Attack on 13-Round CLEFIA
We put one additional round on the plaintext side and two additional rounds on the ciphertext side of the 10-round improbable differentials to attack first 13 rounds of CLEFIA that captures RK 1 , RK 23,1 ⊕ W K 2,1 , RK 24 , and RK 25 . We place the whitening key W K 2 at the XOR with the 11th-round output word x {11,2} and XOR with RK 23 . Moreover, we place the whitening key W K 1 at the XOR with the first round output word x {1,2} , as shown in Fig. 5 . These movements are equivalent transformations.
Data Collection. For a single choice of ψ and corresponding ζ values, we choose 2 K structures of plaintexts where the first word x {1,0} and the second, third and fourth bytes of the second word x {1,1} are fixed (similarly, we fix the first, second and fourth bytes of the second word x {1,1} for a choice of ψ and ζ ). We construct pairs where the first byte (resp. third byte) of the second word x {1,1} has the difference ψ, the third word x {1,2} has the difference ζ (resp. ζ ) and the fourth word x {1,3} has the same difference with the output of F 1 , which is obtained from the guessed round key RK 1 , when the input difference of F 1 is ζ (resp. ζ ). Key Recovery. We keep counters for RK 23,1 ⊕ W K 2,1 |RK 24 |RK 25 for every guess of RK 1 and increase the corresponding counter when the improbable differential is obtained with a guessed key. Keys satisfying the improbable differential are obtained by differential table look-ups indexed on the input and the output differences of the 12th-round F 1 and 13th-round F 1 . The probability of satisfying the improbable differential for a wrong key is p = 2 −40 from the average probabilities 2 −8 and 2 −32 for the 12th and 13th-round F 1 functions respectively. Therefore, the probability of obtaining the improbable differential for the correct key is
During the attack we try to obtain the 104-bit round key, namely RK 1 , RK 23,1 ⊕ W K 2,1 , RK 24 , RK 25 and for the correct key to get the least number of hits, false alarm probability p f a must be less than 2 −104 . Feeding the Algorithm 1 with the inputs p, p 0 , p f a = 2 −105 , and p nd = 1/100 shows that when the threshold T is 673474 < 2 20 , N ∞ ≈ 2 59.38 pairs are needed for the correct key to remain below the threshold and all of the wrong ones to remain above it with a success probability of 99%. 
Conclusion
In previously defined statistical differential attacks on block ciphers, attacker's aim is to find an incident that is more probable for the correct key than a random key. Moreover, an impossible differential attack uses an impossible differential that is not possible when tried with the correct key. However, in this paper we introduced the improbable differential attack in which a given differential is less probable when tried with the correct key. Hence the impossible differential attack is just a special case of the improbable differential attack. We also modified the data complexity estimates given for statistical attacks by Blondeau et al. in order to use them in improbable differential attacks.
Moreover, we defined the almost miss in the middle technique for obtaining improbable differentials and we introduced a method for expanding impossible differentials to improbable differentials when suitable differentials that can be put on the top or the bottom of an impossible differential exist. Finally, we proposed improbable differential attacks on 13, 14, and 15-round CLEFIA by using this expansion method. To the best of our knowledge, these are the best cryptanalytic results on CLE-FIA. Results of these improbable differential attacks and the impossible differential attacks of [10] on CLEFIA are summarized in Table 2 .
In order to provide security against improbable attacks, block cipher designers should ensure that their designs contain no good improbable differentials. Since the almost miss in the middle technique uses two truncated differentials, providing upper bounds for truncated differentials may be used to provide security against improbable attacks. 
